Abstract: Performance pay is of growing importance to the wage structure as it applies to a rising share of employees. At the same time wage dispersion is growing continuously. This leads to the question of how the growing use of performance pay schemes is related to the increase in wage inequality? German SOEP data for the years 1984 to 2009 confirm the large increase in the application of performance pay schemes. This in turn led to an upward shift of the wage distribution by about one log point. However, it did not contribute to the growth in wage inequality. Even though wage inequality grew within the group of employees who receive performance pay, it grew even more so within the group who do not. Still, the wage difference between both wage schemes remained flat over the distribution. The empirical analysis employs sequential decompositions in a quantile regression framework.
Introduction
Performance pay is of growing importance to the wage structure as it applies to a rising share of employees. This trend has been observed in several industrialized countries over the past decades (Lemieux et al., 2009) . A parallel trend has been that of growing wage inequality (Autor et al., 2008) . This prompts the following research question: How is the rise in wage inequality related to the growing use of performance pay schemes?
Performance pay has been found to contribute strongly to growing wage inequality in the US mainly in the top of the wage distribution (Lemieux et al., 2009; Heywood and Parent, 2009 ). Lemieux et al. (2009) quantify this effect to amount to 21% of the growth in wage dispersion between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, based on the reweighting method of DiNardo et al. (1996) . I will extend their analysis by adding a term for the incidence of performance pay jobs in a sequential decomposition. Above all, the contribution of this paper is to study in depth the case of Germany.
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The case of Germany is interesting because its wage structure follows the international trends in growing wage dispersion (Dustmann et al., 2009 ) and the increasing use of performance pay schemes (Pannenberg and Spiess, 2009) .
2 At the same time, the labor market has experienced dramatic shifts from strong rigidity to more flexibility (Fitzenberger et al., 2011) . These shifts rendered possible "Germany's jobs miracle" (Krugman, 2009) , which took place on the German labor market during the Great Recession (Möller, 2010) . Still, the dramatic growth in wage inequality in Germany remains in parts unresolved. Several explanations are possible, one of which is skill-biased technological change (Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor et al., 2003) . However, Antonczyk et al. (2009) find that changes in the tasks cannot explain the growing wage dis-persion in Germany. Deunionization can explain only a small part of it (Antonczyk et al., 2010) while differences between industries and establishments play a large role (ibid., Card et al., 2012) . Can performance pay provide the missing explanation for rising wage inequality?
The key research question of this study is the following: How would the wage distribution have developed, had the incidence of pay for performance not increased? In order to answer this question, this study will employ a sequential decomposition method in a quantile regression framework following Machado and Mata (2005) and Chernozhukov et al. (2008) . This sequential decomposition method is capable of separating the distributional effects of the growing incidence of performance pay jobs from changes in the composition of the workforce, and from changes in the returns to these characteristics.
The empirical analysis uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel study (SOEP) . This long and large panel data set provides information on performance pay. The period of analysis is from 1984 to 2009.
The results confirm the strong increase of performance pay in Germany. Its incidence has more than doubled over the observation period from 1984 to 2009. Wage inequality has grown strongly over the observation period. The growing incidence of performance pay schemes led to an upward shift of the wage distribution by about one log point. However, it did not contribute to the growth in wage inequality. The stark growth in wage inequality was instead driven by changes in the remuneration scheme (i.e. the coefficients in the decomposition) as well as by the composition of the workforce. Even though wage inequality grew within the group of employees who receive performance pay, it grew even more so within the group who do not. Although the wage difference between both wage schemes grew over time, it remained flat over the distribution.
This paper proceeds as follows: The next section describes the existing literature. Section 3 explains the data and provides extensive descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the sequential decomposition method and presents the results together with some sensitivity checks. The final section concludes.
2 Literature Review
Rising wage inequality has been the major empirical trend in labor economics in recent decades (OECD, 2008 (OECD, , 2011 Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2012) . The strong increase in wage dispersion in the US and the UK since the 1980s has affected the entire distribution (Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor et al., 2008) . In contrast, wage inequality in West Germany began to rise first at the top of the distribution in the 1980s, and has only started to grow at the bottom since the 1990s (Fitzenberger, 1999; Kohn, 2006; Gernandt and Pfeiffer, 2007; Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2009) . Recently, the growth in wage dispersion has been dramatic with an increase of more than 10 log percentage points at the 90-10-differential from 2001 to 2006 (see Antonczyk et al., 2010) . Growing wage inequality has been found to affect the top as well as the bottom of the wage distribution which makes it an important component in the debate on poverty and the low wage sector (ibid.).
Parallel to the trend of growing wage inequality, the incidence of pay for performance has increased in many countries (Booth and Frank, 1999; Lemieux et al., 2009; Pannenberg and Spiess, 2009 ). Still, Brown and Heywood (2002) conclude that there is no general trend towards more performance pay. Nevertheless, the end of the last century has been a time for large experiments (ibid.), which makes it interesting to study the growing use of performance pay schemes. Why should the incidence increase at all? Generally speaking, there is a growing heterogeneity of firms which goes hand in hand with a growing need for flexibility on the firm level (Fitzenberger et al., 2011; Card et al., 2012) . This trend could for example be driven by trade globalization or skill-biased technological change (SBTC). Moreover SBTC, which changes the relative demand for skilled labor, translates into changed relative returns to skills (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Juhn et al., 1993; Katz and Autor, 1999) . Lemieux et al. (2009) argue that pay for performance could serve as the channel by which changed returns to skills are converted into actual wage changes and therefore be growing (also see Heywood and Parent, 2009 ).
How does the growing incidence of pay for performance affect wages? Above all, it is expected to induce higher effort which would in turn generate higher wages (Booth and Frank, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Dohmen and Falk, 2011) . At the same time, performance pay leads to sorting of workers: As employees learn about their own productivity and about their willingness to provide effort, they sort into the preferred pay scheme (Lazear, 1986 (Lazear, , 2000 Dohmen and Falk, 2011) . Moreover, wage insecurity is higher in variable pay schemes, which could be compensated by higher wages (Seiler, 1984; Amuedo-Dorantes and Mach, 2003) .
Furthermore, starting from a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, classical labor economics theory assumes that wages equal the marginal product of labor, that is, productivity. However, wages often differ from this for different reasons such as asymmetric information, search frictions, delayed compensation, collective bargaining, etc. (see, e.g., De la Rica et al., 2010) . Against this background, pay for performance can be seen as a mechanism to more closely align wages with productivity. Empirical support for this mechanism is given in the studies by Lemieux et al. (2009) and De la Rica et al. (2010) . They show that in a fixed wage regime, wages are tied closer to job and firm characteristics whereas in a variable pay scheme, wages are more closely related to the individual worker's characteristics.
In addition to the level effect, performance pay is expected to go along with rising wage inequality. By definition, wages vary more on the individual level in a variable pay scheme than in a fixed wage scheme, because productivity or performance vary more than the determinants of a fixed wage, such as education and tenure (Seiler, 1984) . Additional variation could be caused by outside factors -cooperating partners, product demand, etc. -or by the measurement mechanism itself (Lazear, 1986, p. 421) . Hence, wage variability is expected to grow as performance pay schemes become more prevalent over time.
Empirical studies have confirmed the positive correlation between pay for performance and wage inequality (for early studies see Seiler, 1984; Lazear, 2000) . This has been attributed to unobserved worker heterogeneity (Parent, 1999; Booth and Frank, 1999; Pannenberg and Spiess, 2009; Barth et al., 2012) . Also within-firm wage variation is higher when performance pay prevails (Barth et al., 2012; Lazear, 2000) . Two recent studies by Lemieux et al. (2009) and Heywood and Parent (2009) reconfirm that performance pay tends to be associated with higher wage inequality particularly at the top of the distribution. Both studies analyze the US using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period of 1976 to 1998. By means of the reweighting method of DiNardo et al. (1996) , Lemieux et al. (2009) quantify the contribution of performance pay to growing wage inequality in the US to 21%. They also show that wage inequality has grown within and between variable and fixed wage schemes. The present paper uses a similar empirical strategy, but for the case of Germany. For Germany, Pannenberg and Spiess (2009) analyze the variance of wages by also using the SOEP data, but their study is limited to the time period from 1991 to 2000. From a general equilibrium (GEE) model they find that unobserved heterogeneity in the wage and performance pay equation are significantly positively correlated. They do not model the contribution of the growing use of performance pay to wage inequality as will be analyzed in the following.
Data and descriptive statistics
The following empirical analyses are based on data from the German SocioEconomic Panel (SOEP), a large household survey for the years 1984 to 2009 (Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), 2011; for a description see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005) . 3 This data set is comparable to the PSID in the US and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) in the UK, but larger in size. The empirical analyses are limited to full-time employees in West Germany aged 25 to 65, excluding self-employed and public-sector employees, as for these groups the meaning of pay for performance is not evident. This leaves a sample size of nearly 13,000 employees in more than 20,000 job matches. All procedures use sampling weights provided by the SOEP data in order to obtain representative results. The survey asks for several additional pay components from the employer of which one category is "profit-sharing, premiums and bonuses". It also asks for the corresponding gross amount. I will refer to this pay component as "performance pay" in the present study. More precisely, in this study, "pay for performance" is defined as profit-sharing, premia and bonuses excluding piece rates, comissions, overtime premia, Christmas and vacation pay.
Given that this variable pay component depends on performance, some eligible employees may not receive a bonus because their performance has not been satisfactory. For this reason, it is not sufficient to measure performance pay in the given year, but rather "performance pay jobs" are defined (following Lemieux et al., 2009 and Parent, 2009 ). This new category captures all job matches with a variable pay scheme, regardless of whether a bonus was paid in the specific year or not. Thus performance pay-jobs ("PP jobs" in the following) are defined as those job matches which have paid for performance at least once in the past. This definition differs from the one of Lemieux et al. (2009) and Heywood and Parent (2009) as here only bonus payments in the past or present define a PP job -not those in the future. This definition allows observing in the data the new introduction of pay for performance in a given job match.
This definition would however distort the observed share of employees in performance pay jobs at the beginning of the observation period. In order to present descriptive statistics that are comparable over time, an end-point correction is applied following Lemieux et al. (2009) , which is described in the appendix on page 29.
How has the incidence of performance pay in Germany developed over the past 25 years? Table 1 and figure 1 in the appendix show the answer using the aforementioned definition and correcting for the end-point problem. Overall, the general trend has pointed towards a steady increase. This is in line with Pannenberg and Spiess (2009) who document the same trend for Germany over the 1990s.
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The absolute level of performance payments is also provided by the data set and it is not negligible. Among those employees who receive performance pay in the current year, the median value in this data set is 1700 Euro per year (see table 2 ). This corresponds to one half of the monthly salary in bonuses per year (i.e. the share of yearly performance payments as a share of monthly earnings is 53.3%).
7 Only a few other data sets also include the amount of pay for performance (Lemieux et al., 2009; De la Rica et al., 2010; Ockenfels et al., 2010; Kampkötter and Sliwka, 2011) . For the US and for Spain, somewhat higher relative amounts are reported.
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As later on the entire wage distribution will be analyzed, it is interesting to look at the dissemination of pay for performance over the whole wage distribution. Wages are defined as real log hourly wages including overtime pay and overtime hours. Figure 3 shows how the volume of annual performance payments is all job matches receive pay for performance from the start. Note however, that these are a very conservative estimates, as job changes cannot be identified very reliably from the data and therefore too many job changes may have been counted. 5 Qualitatively similar results are obtained from different subsamples of the data, see subsection VI.2 in the appendix.
6 Another question in the SOEP data explicitly asks for performance evaluations by the supervisor in the years 2004 and 2008. According to this, the share of employees whose performance was evaluated in the year 2004 ranges between 25% (Cornelißen et al., 2011) and 31% (Grund and Sliwka, 2010) , depending on the exact specification of the data set. On the firm level, Berger et al. (2011) report that 37% of all firms use performance-related pay.
7 Monthly earnings are used as a reference point here, as annual earnings would include Christmas pay and the like. However, for comparison, expressed in terms of annual earnings, performance pay amounts to less than four percent.
8 Lemieux et al. (2009) report that in the US performance pay makes up about 10% in annual earnings. For Spain, De la Rica et al. (2010) report that the share of performance pay in hourly wages (and thus in annual earnings) is more than 13%, but the reported numbers are hard to compare as different studies may measure different wage components.
distributed over the wage distribution in absolute terms (left side) and in relative terms as measured by the share of monthly earnings (right side). All these numbers are conditional on receiving pay for performance in the current year. Both indicators for the volume of performance pay remain rather flat up to about the 70 th percentile and increase steeply at the very top of the wage distribution.
Over time, the incidence of pay for performance has increased. How does this affect the volume of payments for performance? As table 2 shows, the absolute amount of bonus payments has increased from about 1500 to about 1900 Euro per year at the median of the unconditional performance pay distribution. Again, it is important to consider the distribution of these payments over the entire wage distribution. It can be seen that the volume of pay for performance has grown strongest within the top part of the wage distribution.
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The goal of this study is to analyze wage changes over time, such that the observation period should be as long as possible. To avoid misclassification of PP jobs at the start of the observation period, the starting year of the comparison will not be 1984, but 1986. Moreover, several years have to be pooled to achieve reasonable case numbers at the start of the observation period, i.e. 1986-1989. Correspondingly, the time frame for the end period will be the pooled observations from 2006 to 2009.
Employees in PP jobs are better educated, have longer tenure, and work in larger firms, as compared to non-PP jobbers (see table 3 in the appendix). The same result has, for example, been found by De la Rica et al. (2010) for Spain and Cornelißen et al. (2011) for Germany. This points towards a strong positive selection of employees into job matches with pay for performance (also see Dohmen and Falk, 2011) . Also, in line with Grund and Kräkel (2012) performance pay is found more frequently with increasing tenure and occupational level. As a result, employees who work in PP job matches receive real hourly wages that are 30 log points higher than those of non-PP jobbers (i.e. 36%).
Further evidence on this aspect is provided in appendix VI.3. Table 5 and figure 4 display the difference between the two unconditional wage distributions from 1986 -1989 and 2006 -2009 . It shows that wages have on average increased by 7.7 log points over the 20 years. However, at the bottom of the wage distribution, there have been notable real wage losses (-4.3 log points at the 10 th percentile). At the same time, wage increases have been strongest at the top of the distribution (+17.5 log points at the 90 th percentile). Thus, the 90-10 differential has widened by 21.6 log points over the observation period of 20 years. The trend of rising wage dispersion in West Germany has also been documented by Fitzenberger (1999) ; Dustmann et al. (2009 ), Antonczyk et al. (2010 and Pannenberg and Spiess (2009) .
Let us now turn to the central question of whether part of this increase in wage inequality can be explained by the growing use of performance pay schemes.
Decomposition results
The following analysis will decompose changes in the wage structure over time.
The following subsection will explain in more detail the sequential decomposition method. Then, the results will be presented and explained. Afterwards, some further decomposition results will address additional research questions. In the end, sensitivity checks are performed to scrutinize the key result.
Sequential decomposition method
To analyze the effect of pay for performance on the entire wage distribution, the classical decomposition approach of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) is not sufficient as it refers only to the mean. Their method has been extended to capture the entire wage distribution mainly by DiNardo et al. (1996) and by Machado and Mata (2005) . Previous decomposition analyses on the relation between performance pay and the wage structure have used the reweighting method of DiNardo et al. (1996) (see Lemieux et al., 2009 and Parent, 2009) . That method has the advantage of being easy to implement and thanks to its semiparametric nature imposes few restrictions on the functional form. For exactly this reason, the method of DiNardo et al. (1996) cannot capture a coefficient effect (as there are no coefficients), but only a residual effect. In contrast, the extension by Machado and Mata (2005) identifies a coefficient effect from specifying a linear quantile regression model (Machado and Mata, 2005, p. 451) . While this parametric modelling is naturally more restrictive, identifying separate effects from coefficients and characteristics may be important for the topic of growing performance pay use. That is because the growing incidence of performance pay jobs may not only change the composition of the employees working in such jobs (characteristics effect) but also the remuneration may respond to this development (coefficients effect). For this reason, the method of Machado and Mata will be used. For the estimation, the procedure from Chernozhukov et al. (2008) is employed.
Specify the τ th quantile of log hourly wages w conditional on the set of covariates X as:
These quantile regressions are estimated separately for both time periods, that is 1986 -1989 and 2006 -2009. 10 The linear quantile regression models are specified as extended Mincer-type log wage equations and include the following covariates: individual-specific characteristics (educational degree, gender, age and age squared), job match specific covariates (tenure and tenure squared, occupational category, and an indicator for temporary contracts) and firm characteristics (firm size in categories, industry branch, and federal state).
The research question is: How would the wage structure have developed, had the incidence of pay for performance not increased? This question can be reformulated to resemble the decomposition terminology, that is: How would the wage structure have developed if PP job status and the pay scheme had remained constant? Hence, in the decomposition over time it is not sufficient to measure the contribution of the characteristics and the coefficients, but a PP job-term will be added. 11 Therefore, the decomposition follows this equation:
q(X 06 , P P 06 , β 06 ) − q(X 86 , P P 86 , β 86 )
Overall wage change = q(X 06 , P P 06 , β 06 ) − q(X 06 , P P 06 , β 86 )
Coefficients effect (2) + q(X 06 , P P 06 , β 86 ) − q(X 06 , P P 86 , β 86 ) PP-jobs effect + q(X 06 , P P 86 , β 86 ) − q(X 86 , P P 86 , β 86 )
Characteristics effect
It decomposes the change in the wage structure over time (on the left hand side) into changes in coefficients (1 st term on the right), changes in the incidence of PP jobs (2 nd term) and changes in characteristics (3 rd term).
The first step involves simulation of the wage structure if individuals from 2006 were paid as in 1986, i.e. according to the remuneration scheme from 1986. This is denoted by the counterfactual wage distribution q(X 06 , P P 06 , β 86 ). The resulting coefficients effect quantifies how changes in the remuneration scheme over time have contributed to changes in wage inequality.
Second, the hypothetical individuals from 2006 living in the labor market of 1986 have their PP job status set back to the level of 1986. This is denoted by the counterfactual wage distribution q(X 06 , P P 86 , β 86 ). The resulting PP jobs effect quantifies the contribution of the growing incidence of performance pay, holding the composition of the workforce and the wage structure constant. 12 It is a lower bound because it does not consider the response of the remuneration scheme.
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Third, the final step in this sequential decomposition consists of changing the characteristics from 1986 to 2006 levels. This characteristics effect captures changes in the composition of the workforce such as educational upskilling or changes in the industry structure.
14 The key assumption in any decomposition analysis is that a change in the covariates X will not change the parameters of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (DiNardo et al., 1996; Chernozhukov et al., 2008; Fortin et al., 2010) . In this application it means that changes in the covariates X will not change the coefficients of the conditional distribution of the wage w given X, i.e. will not change the remuneration scheme. Therefore, a decomposition method by definition assumes away any general equilibrium effects.
The crucial step in the simulation process concerns the second component, i.e. the PP jobs effect. In order to estimate q(X 06 , P P 86 , β 86 ), the hypothetical PP jobs status in 1986 has to be simulated for individuals from 2006. The correlations between the covariates and the PP job status is accounted for by estimating a propensity score for both time periods separately. From this, the propensity of working in a PP job in 1986 is predicted for individuals with characteristics from 2006, and vice versa. That is, φ(X 06 * β 86 ) gives the propensity for individuals from 2006 of having been working in a PP job in 1986 (and vice versa). Then, counterfactual individual wages for both hypothetical statuses are estimated, i.e. w(X 06 , P P 86 = 1, β 86 ) and w(X 06 , P P 86 = 0, β 86 ). For estimation of the quantiles of the counterfactual wage distribution (X 06 , P P 86 , β 86 ), both hypothetical wages are included and weighted by the propensity score (for the case with P P 86 = 1) and by 1 − propensity score (for the case with
Sequential decomposition results
The results of the decomposition analysis can be found in table 6 and in figure  5 in the appendix. To keep the figures readable, only the confidence band that corresponds to the PP jobs effect of interest is displayed in figure 5 .
16
The total difference recapitulates the growing wage inquality over time and is about to be explained by the decomposition.
17
The coefficients are the largest contributor to this increase in wage inequality. More precisely, changes in the remuneration scheme have contributed to rising wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution, but less so at the top. Still, the top half of the wage distribution has seen strong wage level increases due to changing returns. What could be the explanation for these strong changes in the returns to characteristics? Antonczyk et al. (2010) find very large effects due to changed returns to sector affiliation for Germany, i.e. increasing between-industry differentials. Very recent research by Card et al. (2012) points to the growing importance of firm-and invididual-specific heterogeneity as well as growing assortative matching between employees and employers. Several other explanations are possible, among them the prominent hypothesis of skill-biased technological change (SBTC, see e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor et al., 2008) . As SBTC changes the relative demand for skilled labor, the prices for skilled labor change, which should reflect in the coefficients effect. If skilled labor is found mainly at the top of the wage distribution, then it is not surprising to find the largest coefficient effect in this part, too, which is in line with the results presented here. The negative coefficients effect found for the very bottom of the wage distribution suggests wage losses in this part of the wage distribution, which, however, would stand in contrast to the task-based approach to SBTC (Autor et al., 2003) . Alternative explanations, such as trade globalization (Blinder, 2006) require further research.
The characteristics effect affects wage inequality steadily over the entire distribution. It is very pronounced in the top half of the wage distribution where the coefficients effect is rather flat. Thus, the changing composition of characteristics (such as educational upgrading and industry changes) raises wages in the top of the wage distribution, while the bottom sees real wage losses. One possible explanation could stem from employees with bad labor market characteristics who newly enter full-time work in the private sector in West Germany, e.g. due to labor market reforms in the early 2000s. Moreover, deunionization could affect the characteristics effect if collective bargaining coverage is correlated with the observed characteristics.
18 As Antonczyk et al. (2010) show in their characteristics effect, declining collective bargaining coverage contributes significantly to growing wage inequality, but the effect is small in magnitude.
Finally, the key result is given by the PP jobs effect. The results show that this effect remains completely flat over the distribution. The change of the wage distribution that can be attributed to the rising incidence of pay for performance is an upward shift on the order of one log point. Although the magnitude of the effect seems small at first sight, it is not negligible. At the median, for example, the increase in the incidence of PP jobs explains about 11% of the entire change over time (1.0 log point out of 8.8 log points, see last row of table 6). However, while the growing incidence of PP jobs contributed to the wage level, it did not contribute to wage inequality because the effect is flat. This result differs from the one found for the U.S. by Lemieux et al. (2009) . They find that performance pay contributes to rising wage inequality, particularly above the 80 th percentile. They reach their conclusion by analyzing wage changes within the group of performance pay jobs. This is what we will turn to next.
Additional decomposition results
Another way to think about growing wage inequality is in terms of within vs. between inequality. How did the growing use of performance pay schemes af-fect the wages of the "insiders", i.e. those employees who work in a variable pay scheme? For example, do different types of employees receive performance pay now compared to then, such that the composition of the characteristics of this group has changed? Put differently, was the positive selection of employees into job matches fostered or washed out over time? Or did the selection into performance pay job matches remain unchanged, but the remuneration scheme changed, i.e. the coefficients? This leads to the question of how wage inequality has changed over time within performance pay jobs. The corresponding decomposition is simpler than the one considered so far, as the PP jobs effect drops out. Hence the decomposition is of the simpler classic type following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) and follows this equation:
Overall wage change
Coefficients effect
Characteristics effect
The results are found in table 7 and in figure 6 where results are displayed without (left) and with confidence bands (right side). The results show that wages have increased over time for the group of performance pay workers throughout the entire wage distribution. The wage gain over time is increasing over the bottom half of the distribution and remains stable above that point. This means that within the group of PP jobbers, wage inequality has increased in the bottom half of the wage distribution, driven almost completely by changes in the remuneration scheme. In contrast, characteristics have contributed only slightly to an improvement of wages. This falsifies the hypothesis that the increased incidence of PP jobs worsens the selection of employees into this wage regime.
The same questions apply to those employees who work under a fixed wage: Did the selection of this group worsen as more employees switch into a performance pay scheme? Table 8 and figure 7 show that the growth in wage inequality has been much more pronounced for non-PP jobbers. 20 For them, over 20 years wage inequality, as measured by the 90-10 differential, has increased by 12.7 log points. Again, a large part of the wage increase over time is driven by changes in the coefficients. At the same time, changes in the labor market characteristics of the employees contribute significantly to the wage losses. There are nowadays more employees with worse labor market characteristics in non-PP jobs. This could be reasonable if the labor market reforms of the decade of the 2000s had the effect of drawing more individuals into full-time employment and if these individuals work in non-PP jobs (at least at first). The curvature of this characteristics effect is rather steep, meaning that it contributes strongly to the growing wage inequality within this group of non-PP jobbers.
Comparison of the coefficients effect shows that it is larger for PP jobbers than for non-PP jobbers. This means that the returns to observable characteristics have increased more stronlgy within PP jobs. This resembles the result found by Lemieux et al. (2009) who explain this by SBTC. Thus, while the underlying cause for the increasing importance of coefficients remains unresolved, this analysis gives a clue by showing that it affects PP jobs more strongly than non-PP jobs.
Finally, how did the wage differences between these two groups of workers evolve? As more employees receive pay for performance, did the segregation between the two types raise the wage difference? Or are the two groups becoming more similar in terms of characteristics and/or remuneration and, consequently, in wages? In order to analyze this, the wage difference between PP and non-PP jobs is decomposed as follows: non-PP jobs has shifted upwards by about eight log points. Characteristics explain a very large share of the wage difference, particularly at the bottom of the wage distribution. This suggests that the selection on observables plays a growing role in explaining the wage difference. This is likely due to the growing labor force participation of individuals who formerly would not have worked (least not full-time). Apparently, these individuals, who on average have less valued labor market characteristics, mostly work in non-PP jobs. In addition, the contribution of coefficients to the wage difference is growing only slightly over time, meaning that the remuneration scheme hardly responded to the changed selection of individuals. In sum, wage inequality within and between both job types has grown over time in Germany, similarly to that in the US (Lemieux et al., 2009 ).
What have we learned? Wage inequality has increased over the observation period of 20 years in West Germany. As more employees received pay for performance, wage inequality grew within the group of PP jobs and even more so within the group of non-PP jobs. The wage difference between both types of jobs also grew over time, but remains flat. These considerations add further evidence to the core result that the growing incidence of pay for performance did not contribute to growing wage inequality. Still, there has been a small but significant upward shift in wages which is due to the growing use of performance pay.
Sensitivity checks
There will be four robustness tests checking the sensitivity of the results first to the order of the decomposition, second to the matching procedure, third to a certain subgroup of observations and fourth to a different left hand side distribution.
First, sequential decompositions are sensitive to the order of the decomposition (Fortin et al., 2010; Antonczyk et al., 2009; Chernozhukov et al., 2008; DiNardo et al., 1996) . Therefore, to check the sensitivity of the results, the order of the decomposition will now be altered. The original order of decomposition first extracted the coefficients effect, second the PP jobs effect and third the effect of characteristics. (The short-hand notation for this order will be: β, PP-job, X.) Now, let us alter the order of the decomposition the following way (i.e. to β, X, PP-job):
+ q(X 06 , P P 06 , β 86 ) − q(X 86 , P P 06 , β 86 )
Characteristics effect + q(X 86 , P P 06 , β 86 ) − q(X 86 , P P 86 , β 86 )
PP-jobs effect
The first step remains the same. However, the change of the PP job status now takes place in the last step. The difference to the original order of decomposition is that the characteristics of the employees in 1986 are now included instead of the characteristics from 2006. Thus the propensity score is now based on the probit regression from 2006 rather than from 1986.
Changing the order of a sequential decomposition can completely change the results, as the underlying sequence of counterfactual wage distributions changes. This said, it is astonishing to see the robustness of the results in figure 9 in the appendix. The results for two more permutations of the order are also displayed there. The PP jobs effect is always very flat, which confirms our result that it did not contribute to the rise in wage dispersion. At the same time, the significance of the PP jobs effect is not always given. Therefore, the result of a constant upward wage shift does not always remain significant when changing the order. Still, the result concerning wage inequality proves extremely robust in this test.
Second, there is a methodological change in the prediction of the PP job status. So far, both potential outcomes (i.e. PP job = 0 and = 1) are calculated and weighted by the propensity score. Now, to check for robustness, instead of applying this probabilistic procedure in the simulation process, a deterministic procedure is implemented. Again, the propensity of working in a PP job in the other time period is employed. However, instead of using the propensity score for weighting the two potential states, the propensity score is now used to create a cut-off point between the two states. The cut-off point is chosen such that the simulation of the PP jobs status generates the same share of individuals in this job type as has been observed in reality. In 1986, 17.9% of employees worked in a PP job. For the 17.9% of employees in 2006 with the highest propensity score, it is now assumed that they would have worked in a PP job in 1986. This procedure yields the results displayed in figure 10 . Again, the PP jobs effect is extremely flat across the wage distribution, reconfirming that it did not contribute to rising wage inequality. The only difference is a small reduction of the effect at the top of the distribution, which is however not significant. Hence, the core result is reconfirmed by this test.
Third, another way to check the sensitivity of the results to the prediction of the past PP job status is to avoid the prediction procedure completely. Recall that the hypothetical PP job status in 1986 is predicted on the basis of the covariates from 2006. However, there is a group of individuals for whom the PP job status in 1986 can be observed directly from the data rather than being predicted. These are those individuals whose data can be observed both in the 1980s and in the 2000s, i.e. respondents who remain in the sample for a very long time period. For this particular group two results can be compared: Once using the prediction procedure as before and once using the true value instead. This way the contribution of the prediction procedure can be quantified. The results are found in figure 11 and table 10 in the appendix. The results in the left part of the figure are estimated identically to the previous results but with restriction to this particularly selected group of observations (n=467).
22 While the overall wage difference has shifted upwards compared to the general results by seven log points, the coefficients effect is notably steeper than before. The characteristics effect displays a considerably higher level and different shape which is due to the fact that now the same individuals are followed over time and attrition is suppressed, so that some characteristics change less than before while age increases monotonically. Finally, for the PP jobs effect, a flat effect on the order of zero is observed. Next, these results are compared to an estimation on the same observations but switching off the prediction of the PP job status in 1986 by using the true value (right panel in figure 11 ). This could affect the PP jobs effect as well as the characteristics effect, while the coefficients effect remains identical by definition. Using this simplified estimation procedure reduces the characteristics effect slightly by about two log points. This suggests that the characteristics effect is blown up slightly by the regular estimation procedure. In contrast, the PP jobs effect is larger when using the true rather than the predicted PP job status and remains rather flat but with minor increases over the wage distribution. If these results were generalized, this would suggest that the estimation procedure employed in this study estimates the PP jobs effect rather conservatively, i.e. attenuating it towards zero. Nevertheless, the core result of a small and flat PP jobs effect appears to be very robust.
As the fourth sensitivity check, the actual wage distribution is decomposed instead of the predicted distribution. The predicted wage distribution that has been used so far is based on the predicted wages from the underlying quantile regressions. It thus smoothed over the error terms. Instead, this current sensitivity check decomposes the actual wage difference. That is, instead of q(X 06 , P P 06 , β 06 ) − q(X 86 , P P 86 , β 86 ) it decomposes q(w 06 ) − q(w 86 ). The resulting changes in the wage distribution are compared in figure 12 . Both distributions hardly differ. Still, the growth in wage inequality over time is a little more pronounced as can be seen at the top (about 70 th percentile) and at the bottom of the distribution (about 10 th percentile). To check how this affects the performance pay effect, it is necessary to choose one of the permutations where the performance pay effect is indeed affected by this change (i.e. it is not the middle component of the sequential decomposition). Therefore, the left part of figure 13 decomposes the three terms in the order β, X, PP-job and the right figure corresponds to the ordering β, X, PP-job. They show that the performance pay effect is small and seldomly significant. 23 Again, it does not increase over the distribution and thus does not contribute to growing wage inequality.
To conclude, the result that the growing use of performance pay jobs has no direct effect on wage inequality is very robust to various alterations in the estimation process.
Conclusions
This study provides a detailed description of the contribution of performance pay to the German wage structure. The growing incidence of variable pay schemes affects ever more employees and their productivity and wages. The share of employees working in a performance pay job (defined as a job match that has paid for performance at least once in the past) in Germany increased steadily, more than doubling over the observation period from 1984 to 2009. The steepest increase took place in the late 1990s. The volume of performance pay is not negligible as it amounts to one half monthly salary at the median. 24 Employees in performance pay jobs are positively selected.
One of the most important trends in empirical labor economics over the past few decades has been growing wage inequality. Several factors contribute to this trend such as globalization, skill-biased technological change and deunionization. As the increasing use of pay for performance runs parallel to the growth in wage inequality, it constitutes another potential contributing factor. So the question analyzed in this study is whether performance pay correlates with growing wage dispersion. This question is analyzed using quantile regressions and a sequential decomposition method (DiNardo et al., 1996; Chernozhukov et al., 2008; Fortin et al., 2010) . This article contributes to the literature by analyzing the contribution of the growing incidence of performance pay jobs to the increasing wage inequality for the case of Germany.
The results show that the growing use of performance pay did not contribute to the growth in wage dispersion. This key result is very robust to variations in the estimation procedure. Still, there has been a small but significant upward shift in the wage level due to the growing use of performance pay. The magnitude of this shift is around one log point which explains about 11% of wage growth at the median. The growth in wage inequality is instead explained by changes in the characteristics of the workforce (particularly in the top half of the wage distribution) and returns to these characteristics (particularly in the bottom half). Finally, as more employees receive pay for performance, wage inequality grows within performance pay jobs -but even more so within those job matches that do not reward performance. The wage difference between both types of jobs grew over time but remained flat.
The cause for growing wage inequality in Germany is not the growing use of variable pay schemes, as the present analysis has shown. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence presented here points to a growing importance of returns to characteristics that affects employees in performance pay jobs more strongly than in non-performance pay jobs, which Lemieux et al. (2009) would attribute to skill-biased technological change. The underlying cause for this trend needs further investigation. It is likely related to recent findings of growing firm heterogeneity and assortiveness between employees and employers (Card et al., 2012) . So long, a coherent explanation for the underlying cause of the steep growth in wage inequality seems still to be missing -at least for Germany. It appears that the main driving factor for growing wage dispersion is not pay for performance and also changes in the job tasks or deunionization cannot explain a lot.
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VI Appendix
VI.1 End-point correction "Performance pay jobs" are defined as jobs that have paid for performance at least once in the past. Thus, job matches that are observed over a longer period are more likely to be observed as PP jobs. For this reason, job matches that are observed at the beginning of the observation period in 1984 may be misclassified as non-PP jobs if they paid for performance before 1984. In order to correct for this, an end-point correction is applied in analogy to Lemieux et al. (2009) . It proceeds in three steps: First, PP jobs are estimated as a function of calender year and the number of years an individual job-match is observed in the sample. Second, the distribution of years that the job-matches are observed in the sample is held constant at a time in the middle of the observation period. Third, the share of PP jobs is predicted based on this hypothetical distribution of observation years. These shares deviate from the uncorrected shares at the beginning of the observation period. The corrected shares are depicted in the table 1 and figure 1. 
VI.2 Sensitivity to SOEP samples
The SOEP data consists of different samples in which households were added to the data set (usually as "refreshment samples"). This could pose a problem here as the chances of being observed in a PP job rise with the longer observation period of a job match in the data. Therefore, to be on the safe side, the description of the time trend in table 1 and figure 1 relied only on the first intake of data which was drawn in 1984 at the start of the SOEP survey. This subsection checks the sensitivity of the results to inclusion of the different samples of the data. Figure 2 displays the incidence of PP jobs without (left) and with (right) the end-point correction. It displays the results for the following three different samples: First, samples A and B were drawn in 1984 (separate samples for native Germans and foreigners). This is the sample used above for the time trend. Second, sample F is by far the largest refreshment sample and the individuals were first observed in the year 2000. Third, all availble samples are joined. (For more details on the data be referred to the Desktop Companion to the SOEP data by Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005.) Observation of the development of sample F in figure 2 suggests that the elapsed observation period may play an important role in explaining the observed share of job matches which receive pay for performance. At first glance this seems disturbing with respect to the reliability of the results described in this study. Notwithstanding, two aspects are reassuring: First, for the general time trend it seems to be a good proxy to use samples A and B. In particular, at the end of the observation period, all samples reach similar levels of the PP jobs incidence. Second, the change over time will by analyzed in this study by comparing the periods 1986-1989 to 2006-2009 . The latter period is hardly affected by the composition of the different samples of the data. For the earlier period, only samples A and B are available. Therefore, the most part of the analysis will take advantage of using all available samples. 
VI.3 Wage differences
The wage differences between PP and non-PP jobbers are likely not causally due to the job type but to selection, as has been suggested above. Let us briefly investigate this now. Table 4 shows the wage difference that remains after controlling for individual characteristics (education, gender, age and age 2 ), job match characteristics (tenure and tenure 2 , occupational category, and an indicator for temporary contracts), and firm characteristics (firm size, industry, and federal state), as well as year-dummies. The first three columns refer to least squares estimations with standard errors clustered on the job match level. According to this, PP jobs show nearly 8% higher wages (column (1)).
25 Results of similar magnitude are found by Booth and Frank (1999) , who report a wage gain of 9% for men and 6% for women. In the specific context of a glass company, Lazear (2000) even finds a 44%-increase in productivity resulting from the introduction of pay for performance.
These results could be driven by unobserved differences between employees in the fixed and the variable pay scheme. Therefore, the fixed effects estimation analyzes those employees who switch between the regimes in order to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. The share of switchers is 5.8% in the sample, which corresponds to 750 individuals. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity reduces the wage difference between PP and non-PP jobs to about 2.4% (column (4)). This analysis shows that the large wage difference between PP and non-PP jobs is driven to a very large extent by observed and unobserved differences between employees. This is synonymous to a strong positive selection of employees into PP jobs. For workers who switch between the two job types, the wage difference amounts to less than 2%. Parent (2009) interprets fixed effects estimations as a lower bound to the incentive effect induced by performance pay because switches are endogenous. For comparison, Gielen et al. (2010) find an incentive effect from performance related pay on productivity of 9%. This is an important estimate as the introduction of performance pay schemes often aims at an increasing productivity.
When comparing the two time periods of interest, it becomes evident that the wage gains from working in a PP job do not differ significantly (columns (2) and (3)). The fixed effects estimations do not show significant results (columns (5) and (6)), which is probably due to the reduced number of observations. 25 A discussion of how the covariates contribute to wages is omitted here for brevity reasons. From theory it is expected that personal characteristics yield higher returns in PP jobs compared to non-PP jobs (De la Rica et al., 2010; Lemieux et al., 2009) . Likewise, job characteristics are expected to pay off more in non-PP than in PP jobs.
There is thus no indication that the positive selection into PP jobs has changed over time. 
